Epidemics

Rapid spread of disease through a population in a relatively short time (defined by host lifespan)

Different from endemic diseases, which occur at some equilibrial level in the population (e.g., malaria, HIV)

  • note that malaria and HIV may have epidemic phases where they increase rapidly (especially when driven by things like climate/vector abundance/etc.), but there is always some baseline amount of disease.

What are they?

Emergence: Previously unknown disease to a given population/region/country

Re-emergence: Known disease that is coming back in a given population/region/country after a period of absence

Outbreak: Known disease in a given population/region/country

What are examples of each of these?

What is the cost of epidemics?

SARS-COV2: $11-16 trillion

Influenza: $60-90 billion

But tough to say. These estimates consider missed work in these estimates, among other things. Perhaps it’s better to think about the cost of epidemics in terms of disability adjusted life years (1 DALY = 1 year of healthy life lost).

Why do we model epidemics?

Mitigation: we want to lessen disease burden

Understanding: modeling allows us to understand when, why, and how epidemics emerge

Blame: some models can be used to identify key locations or persons responsible for epidemic initiation

How do we model epidemics?

Compartmental models of infectious disease (will definitely cover)

Individual-based or network models (potentially will have time to cover)

Fitting statistical distributions to time series data (may not have time to cover)

Modeling infectious disease : S-I-R

S : susceptible individuals

I : infectious individuals

R : recovered (and immune) individuals

Costs of parasitism do not have to involve death

S-I-R model

\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dS}{dt} &= -\beta SI \\ \frac{dI}{dt} &= \beta SI - dI \\ \frac{dR}{dt} &= dI \end{aligned} \]

SIR curves

S-I-R model

\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dS}{dt} &= -\beta SI \\ \frac{dI}{dt} &= \beta SI - dI \\ \frac{dR}{dt} &= dI \end{aligned} \]

Model assumptions

  • A well-mixed population
  • Same susceptibility for every individual
  • No births of new susceptible individuals
  • Permenant immunity after recovering

The basic reproduction number (\(R_0\))

\(R_0\): the number of secondary infections generated by a single infected individual in a wholly susceptible population

  • It provides a powerful framework for exploring the dynamics and control of epidemics

\(\frac{dI}{dt}>0\) only if \(\beta SI > dI\)

\(R_0 = \frac{\beta SI}{dI} = \frac{\beta S}{d}\)

\(\frac{1}{d}\): the average duration of infection

How do we reduce \(R_0\)?

\[R_0 = \frac{\beta S}{d}\]

  • \(d\) ?
  • \(\beta\) ?
  • \(S\) ?

Vaccination: what fraction of population to achieve herd immunity?


\(R_0 = \frac{\beta S (1 - c)}{d} < 1\)

\(c > 1 - \frac{d}{\beta S} = 1 - \frac{1}{R_0}\)

Pathogen invasion potential

\(R_0\) gives us a nice criteria for whether a pathogen will invade a particular host population.

Invasion potential is often driven by host density, but also on many aspects of the infection process which are not considered in \(R_0\), like …

Think-pair-share: 5 minutes to talk with your neighbors about what you think drives pathogen invasion potential that is not in \(R_0\).

Dallas, T. A., Krkošek, M., & Drake, J. M. (2018). Experimental evidence of a pathogen invasion threshold. Royal Society open science, 5(1), 171975.

Clif et al. 1981

Is \(R_0\) still helpful?

Mitigation

The goal is to reduce transmission or move people out of the susceptible class, right?

How do we do these things?

Hold up.

The SIR model from our reading this week is different.


\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dS}{dt} &= -\beta SI \\ \frac{dI}{dt} &= \beta SI - dI \\ \frac{dR}{dt} &= dI \end{aligned} \]



\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dS}{dt} &= S\lambda - \beta SI \\ \frac{dI}{dt} &= \beta SI - dI \\ \frac{dR}{dt} &= dI \end{aligned} \]

What’s going on here?

Host population size can change, right?

Typically epidemics are on a timescale where might ignore demographic changes.

What if we don’t?

\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dS}{dt} &= S\lambda - \beta SI \\ \frac{dI}{dt} &= \beta SI - dI \\ \frac{dR}{dt} &= dI \end{aligned} \]

What happens in this model to the host population size in the absence of disease?

But considering birth without death isn’t realistic

Consider \(\lambda\) to be birth - death. But infected and recovered individuals can die too, right?

\[ \begin{aligned} \frac{dS}{dt} &= S\lambda - \beta SI \\ \frac{dI}{dt} &= \beta SI - dI - \alpha I \\ \frac{dR}{dt} &= dI - \alpha R \end{aligned} \]

What might this do to population dynamics?

What might this do to infection dynamics?

How do we mitigate infectious disease epidemics?

\(\beta SI\), where \(\beta\) is encounter * susceptibility

  • So you reduce encounter or you reduce susceptibility




End of lecture 1

Recap

We went over:

  • Epidemics:
    • what are they and why do we care?
    • how do we model them?
    • how does additional complexity influence models?
  • density v. frequency dependent transmission
  • \(R_0\) as a concept

Extending the standard SIR

The SIR model is incredibly simple , but also incredibly extensible

Adding an exposed class

\[ \begin{align} \frac{dS}{dt} & = -\beta SI \\ \frac{dE}{dt} & = \beta SI - \omega E\\ \frac{dI}{dt} & = \omega E - \gamma I \\ \frac{dR}{dt} & = \gamma I \end{align} \]

SEIR dynamics

\(R_0\) for SEIR model

  • \(R_0\) is not affected by the addition of the exposed class, as all exposed individuals will get infected.

  • Since all exposed individuals get infected, the number of secondary infections from 1 infected individual in a wholly susceptible population (\(R_0\)) is the same as the SIR.

\[ R_0 = \frac{\beta SI}{dI} = \frac{\beta S}{d} \]

We can do this another way

\[ \frac{d(E+I)}{dt} = (\beta S - \gamma)I \]

The above will become negative if

\[ \beta S_0 - \gamma < 0 \]

Then we can solve for the threshold condition

\[ R_0 = \frac{\beta S_0}{\gamma} \]

Are populations well-mixed?

The well-mixed assumption means that everyone interacts with everyone else, such that every individual has the same risk of infection.

Frequency-dependent transmission in SIR


Density-dependent transmission: \(\beta SI\)


Frequency-dependent transmission: \(\beta S \frac{I}{N}\)

WHAT? WHY?

Begon et al. 2002 Epidemiology and Infection

How does this influence infection dynamics?

Classic density dependent transmission in SIR

How does this influence infection dynamics?

Classic frequency dependent transmission in SIR

How do they compare?

What are the implications?

For frequency-dependent transmission, population size does not matter.

For density-dependent transmission, it definitely does.

epidemic dynamics as function of population size

But where is the pathogen coming from?

In the SIR model, the pathogen is already there, and it is going through a closed population.

What happens when we consider spatial spread of an emerging pathogen?

Harbor seals in the North Sea

In 1988, Harbor seals were having massive die-offs (~60% of the colony) across much of this area

Phocine distemper virus

The cause of these declines was a virus (morbillivirus) related to measles and canine distemper.

  • spread through respiratory aerosol

  • affects lungs of seals causing starvation (can’t dive)

  • recovered individuals become immune

Epidemic progression across space

Each location experienced it’s own epidemic, separated in time.

Evidence for spatially-linked epidemics

Why does SIR ignore between host differences?

  • Because it’s not meant for that

  • …but within host dynamics are important and have consequences for population-level spread.

Superspreaders

unusually contagious organism infected with a disease

This can happen a number of ways, but all essentially influence \(\beta\).

A superspreader can:

  • have a lot of contacts (or have the ‘right’ contacts)
  • have limited disease symptoms (be asymptomatic)
  • have lots of pathogen in them

Typhoid Mary

  • A cook for multiple families (lots of contacts)

  • Had no (or very minor) symptoms (asymptomatic)

  • 22 people presented signs of infection and many died

  • Quarantined at a hospital for 2 years, but freed in 1910

  • Went on to infect 25 more people (2 died)

  • Quarantined again until her death

Mary Mallon (1869-1938) and the history of typhoid fever: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3959940/

High viral load and COVID-19 transmission

Goyal et al. 2021 eLife

So why use SIR given these things?

  • Possible to incorporate into SIR models

  • Fitting these models to data is still one of the best tools we have to understand and mitigate epidemics

  • Sometimes it’s the best we can do

So let’s incorporate some of these things

  • Superspreaders

    • How would we incorporate them?
  • We won’t until a couple weeks from now, but useful to think about how you might do it.

Asymptomatic individuals

Transmission heterogeneity

  • Superspreaders influence \(\beta\) through encounter
  • Asymptomatic individuals influence \(\beta\) only if they differ from symptomatic individuals

Individuals don’t have to have the same \(\beta\)

Transmission heterogeneity

When is transmission heterogeneity really going to matter?

  • small population sizes or weird shaped transmission distributions
a <- rnorm(1000, 3, 0.5)/6
a2 <- sample(a, 10)

When is transmission heterogeneity really going to matter?

When is transmission heterogeneity really going to matter? (n=10)

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When is transmission heterogeneity really going to matter? (n=100)

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How models can inform mitigation efforts

  • We talked about vaccination efforts and herd immunity

  • What about the timing of vaccination efforts?

  • What is the optimal timing of vaccine rollout? (think-pair-share 3 minutes)

    • Things to think about: the structure of the SIR
    • Things not to think about: the feasibility and limited vaccine number

Vaccinate consistently through epidemic

Vaccinate early and hard

Vaccinate when you can only hit a max of 50% coverage

Vaccinate heavily only after when cases start to pick up

One shot vaccination works

  • dependent on lots of things
    • vaccine rollout is perfect
    • the vaccine effects don’t wane
    • other stuff, probably